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FOREWORD 
This Collaborative Paper is one of a series embodying the 
outcome of a workshop and conference on Economic Structural 
Change: Analytical Issues, held at IIASA in July and August 
1983. The conference and workshop formed part of the con- 
tinuing IIASA program on Patterns of Economic Structural Change 
and Industrial Adjustment. 
Structural change was interpreted very broadly: the topics 
covered included the nature and causes of changes in different 
sectors of the world economy, the relationship between inter- 
national markets and national economies, and issues of organi- 
zation and incentives in large' economic systems. 
There is a general consensus that important economic 
structural changes are occurring in the world economy. There 
are, however, several alternative approaches to measuring these 
changes, to modeling the process, and to devising appropriate 
responses in terms of policy measures and institutional re- 
design. Other interesting questions concern the role of the 
international economic system in transmitting such changes, and 
the merits of alternative modes of economic organization in 
responding to structural change. All of these issues were 
addressed by participants in the workshop and conference, and 
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of Tax Payments is Indeterminate: The Case of 
A Tax on Corporate Dis t r ibu t ions  
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1. In t roduct ion .  
This paper concerns an aspect  of t h e  quest ion:  When do govern- 
ment d e f i c i t s  mat ter?  My o r i g i n a l  i n t e n t  w a s  t o  sketch  out  as a 
s t a r t i n g  point  t h e  extension of previous work (1981) showing how 
endogenously generated d e f i c i t s  might have no real e f f e c t ,  a result 
obtained under an assumption of p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  between 
government and p r i v a t e  debt ,  t o  a world of r i s k y  debt  where t h e  latter 
assumption would no longer hold. l f y  i n t u i t i o n  w a s  t h a t  t h e  extension 
would go through in a s t ra ight forward  way. A s  it t u r n s  ou t ,  t h e  exten- 
s i o n  is not  q u i t e  a s  d i r e c t  as I had expected, and I th ink  t h e  d i f -  
f erence may be of some general  interest. I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  condi- 
t i o n s  f o r  n e u t r a l i t y  seem less l i k e l y  t o  be f u l f i l l e d  in a p r a c t i c a l  
context .  
The underlying idea  i s  t h a t  it should not  matter when taxes  are 
paid, provided t h e r e  i s  an appropr ia te  compensating interest element 
in t h e  postponed l i a b i l i t y .  This not ion  c o n f l i c t s  with t h e  assump- 
t i o n  o f t e n  employed t h a t  it is t h e  gwerrrment's cash flow balance 
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Princeton Universi ty and National Bureau of Economic Research. I 
would l i k e  t o  express my apprecia t ion  f o r  t h e  he lp fu l  discussions 
with colleagues a t  t h e  Workshop on Economic S t r u c t u r a l  Change: 
Analyt ica l  I s s u e s ,  held a t  IIASA during August, 1983. 
t h a t  counts, w e n  though cur ren t  d e f i c i t s  may be o f f s e t  by corres- 
pondingly l a r g e r  l i a b i l i t y  f o r  f u t u r e  tax payments, and surpluses 
may r e f l e c t  drawing down l i a b i l i t i e s  f o r  f u t u r e  taxes. This i s s u e  
a r i s e s  expecia l ly  s t rong ly  in t h e  context  of ana lys i s  of proposals 
f o r  consumption-type taxes ,  where t h e r e  is a choice between a l i t e r a l  
consumption t a x  and a t a x  on wage and t r a n s f e r  r ece ip t s .  Typically 
t h e  two approaches generate the  same l i a b i l i t i e s  in a present  value 
sense, but  very  d i f f e r e n t  cash flows. 
The s p e c i f i c  case  I analyze involves a t a x  on d i s t r i b u t i o n s  by 
corporat ions t o  equi ty  holders,  in essence, a dividend tax. I f  such 
a tax is assessed a t  a f l a t  r a t e  which i s  not  expected t o  change, 
and if negat ive  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  ( s a l e s  of new equity)  a r e  included 
( i . e . ,  subs idized) ,  t h e  case is q u i t e  compelling in a p a r t i a l  equi- 
l ibr ium s e t t i n g ,  t h a t  the  l e v e l  of the  t a x  should have no inf luence  on 
real o r  f i n a n c i a l  t r ansac t ions  of a corporat ion ac t ing  in t h e  interest 
of i t s  stockholders. The reason i s  simply t h a t  t h e  f l a t  t a x  changes 
proport ionately t h e  consequences of a l l  decis ions  a s  f a r  as stockholder 
outcomes are concerned. I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h e  trade-off in af te r - t ax  
d o l l a r s  f o r  t h e  shareholders between a l a r g e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  today and 
t h e  consequently smaller  d i s t r i b u t i o n  at  some f u t u r e  time is unaffected 
by the  rate of tax. 
In t h e  absence of all taxes  (and t ransact ions  cos ts )  t h e  various 
vers ions  of t h e  Modigliani-Miller (1958) Theorem t e l l  us t h e  corporation. 
w i l l  be i n d i f f e r e n t  between debt and equi ty  finance. An implicat ion is 
t h a t  t h e  timing of dividend payments i s  a matter of indi f ference .  
Since, a s  I have j u s t  argued informally, a f l a t  t a x  on dividends has 
no e f f e c t  on the  optimal f i n a n c i a l  policy,  something l i k e  t h e  
Modigliani-Miller Theorem should continue t o  hold. Hence, govern- 
ment r e c e i p t s  from such a tax will be determined by t h e  whims of 
corporate managers and needfo lLmno p a r t i c u l a r  path  as f a r  as 
wealth-maximizing ca lcu la t ions  a r e  involved. Will f l u c t u a t i o n s  in 
t a x  r e c e i p t s ,  a s  might a r i s e  in such an economy, have real e f f e c t s ?  
I n  Bradford (1981) I spe l l ed  out  an overlapping-generation 
model in which government debt  does genera l ly  inf luence  the  r a t i o n a l  
expectat ions equil ibrium path,  but  in which v a r i a t i o n s  in government 
debt a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  v a r i a t i o n s  in d i s t r i b u t i o n  t a x  r e c e i p t s  do not  
matter. The ind i f fe rence  about f i n a n c i a l  pol icy  a t  t h e  level of 
t h e  f irm, in s p i t e  of t h e  tax on d i s t r i b u t i o n s ,  carries over t o  
n e u t r a l i t y  of t h e  economy's path  t o  the  choice of f i n a n c i a l  pol icy ,  
even though t h e  flow of tax r e c e i p t s  is af fec ted .  
The b a s i s  f o r  this conclusion is f a i r l y  simple: The c a p i t a l  
investment level chosen by t h e  f i r m  is governed by t h e  going i n t e r e s t  
rate. Therefore, a decis ion t o  i s s u e  an extra d o l l a r  of debt implies 
a decis ion t o  d i s t r i b u t e  an e x t r a  d o l l a r  t o  shareholders. This i n  
t u r n  Implies extra t a x  r e c e i p t s  of t d o l l a r s  (where t is t h e  r a t e  
of t ax ) .  I f  real government spending is f ixed,  t h e  e x t r a  t d o l l a r s  
a r e  devoted t o  reducing t h e  publ ic  debt.  The result thus  f a r  is a 
n e t  add i t ion  of 1-t d o l l a r s  t o  t h e  supply of f i n a n c i a l  assets. 
There remains, however, t h e  equity interest in t h e  corporat ion,  t h e  
value  of which is predicted t o  f a l l ,  n o t  by one d o l l a r ,  as a result 
of t h e  e x t r a  debt cum d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  but by 1-t d o l l a r s ,  in reflec- 
t i o n  of the  government's claim t o  a f r a c t i o n  t of all cash flows 
t o  shareholders. As a consequence, a l l  markets continue t o  c l e a r .  
The f i rm ' s  decis ion has no real e f f e c t ,  even though tax r e c e i p t s  are 
increased. 
The ana lys i s  j u s t  sketched su f f i ced  t o  demonstrate the  point  
t h a t  a t a x  on corporat ion d i s t r i b u t i o n s  may not  have t h e  often-assumed 
incent ive  e f f e c t s  with respect  t o  real and f i n a n c i a l  a l loca t ions .  
The n e u t r a l i t y  of t h e  t a x  as f a r  as t h e  aggregate economy is concerned 
was something of a by-product, necessary f o r  t h e  rkgorous v a l i d i t y  
of t h e  f i r m - l w e l  proposit ion,  but  not  t h e  main point .  I n  t h e  present  
inves t iga t ion  t h e  emphasis i s  reversed,  in t h a t  I am pr inc ipa l ly  con- 
cerned with how t h e  government cash-flow n e u t r a l i t y  result is af fec ted  
if t h e  pe r fec t  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  among f i n a n c i a l  assets, used in t h e  
argument above and a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  t h e  assumption of c e r t a i n t y ,  i s  
replaced i n  t h e  context of an e x p l i c i t  t reatment of uncer ta in ty .  Here 
the  indeterminacy of t h e  f i r m ' s  f i n a n c i a l  policy is needed t o  allow 
governnent r e c e i p t s  t o  vary.  
As it t u r n s  out ,  t h e  earlier results carry  over without s i g n i f i -  
can t  complication when o n l y  equi ty  is  r i s k y  while government and 
corporate debt are r i s k  f r e e ,  and the re fo re  pe r fec t  s u b s t i t u t e s .  
When, however, both government and corporate debt  are r i s k y ,  t h e  
n e u t r a l i t y  conclusions requ i re  two r e s t r i c t i o n s .  F i r s t ,  the  r i s k  
p roper t i e s  of gwernment debt must  be pre-specified. Second, the  
gwernment must be conmcitted t o  maintaining a p o r t f o l i o  of corporate 
bonds amounting t o  a f r e m  t of t h e  t o t a l  supply. While t h e  
p r a c t i c a l  requirements of implementing t h e  f i r s t  r e s t r i c t i o n  .do 
not  seem p a r t i c u l a r l y  demanding, t h e  second r e s t r i c t i o n  would 
involve a major change i n  government f i n a n c i a l  behavior. 
I n  sec t ion  2 below I review t h e  c e r t a i n t y  results a s  a way of 
introducing the  bas ic  model. The extension t o  a model with uncer- 
t a i n t y  is presented in Section 3. 
2. R w i e w  of the  Cer ta in ty  Model. 
The model underlying t h e  ana lys i s  i s  i n  t h e  Samuelson (1959) 
consumption loan t r a d i t i o n .  Individuals  l i v e  f o r  two periods in an 
in f in i t e  tlme horizon world. I n  the  f i r s t  l i fe-per iod each individual  
works (o f fe r ing  one unit  of labor  i n e l a s t i c a l l y ) ,  consumes, and saves 
f o r  ret irement.  "Retirement" descr ibes  t h e  second l i f  e-period, when 
each individual  d issaves  and consumes, leaving nothing t o  h i s  h e i r s .  
A l l  production takes  place in t h e  consolidated corporate sec tor  
which is modeled as a s i n g l e  price-taking firm. Production condit ions 
are described by a neoc lass ica l  production funct ion of c a p i t a l  and 
labor  employed, wi th  constant  r e tu rns  t o  scale. The c a p i t a l  ava i l ab le  
t o  t h e  corporat ion in any period is inher i t ed  from the previous period 
and is thus f ixed in amount before t h e  time of a c t u a l  production. The 
output  of a period may e i t h e r  be consumed or  frozen i n t o  i n f i n i t e l y  
durable c a p i t a l .  Investment is regarded as revers ib le .  
Savings may be held in th ree  forms, bonds i ssued by the  corpora- 
t i o n ,  shares  of i ts common stock,  o r  bonds issued by the  government. 
A given generat ion of individuals  acquires  these  f i n a n c i a l  assets a t  
the  end of i ts f i r s t  l i fe-per iod,  a f t e r  production f o r  t h a t  period 
has been completed, and a f t e r  t h e  investment and f i n a n c i a l  plans of 
the  corporat ion have been rea l i zed .  
The holders of its conrmon s tock "own" t h e  corporat ion.  The 
owners a t  t h e  beginning of a period con t ro l  t h a t  pe r iod ' s  production 
and t h e  r e a l  investment which determines t h e  amount of c a p i t a l  which 
w i l l  be a v a i l a b l e  f o r  use  in production at  t h e  beginning of t h e  next  
period. The owners of t h e  f i rm at t h e  beginning of a period speci fy  
a s  w e l l  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  pol icy  f o r  t h a t  period,  which means they set 
t h e  amount of funds t o  be d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  themselves a s  dividends and 
t h e  amount of corporate borrowing. 
The government's real spending program i s  assumed f ixed ,  f o r  
s impl ic i ty  a t  a zero l e v e l .  The government is  thus modeled a s  a 
mechanical cash flow manager: in each period t h e  i n h e r i t e d  debt 
ob l iga t ion  must be  paid o f f ,  with any s h o r t f a l l  of tax r e c e i p t s  covered 
by t h e  i s s u e  of new debt .  
No t a t ion .  
To descr ibe  t h e  results of t h e  ana lys i s  formally, I use t h e  
follawing no ta t ion  (involving minor changes from t h a t  of t h e  1981 
paper t o  f a c i l i t a t e  extension t o  incorpora te  uncertainty):  
L: t o t a l  number of l abor  u n i t s  a v a i l a b l e  f o r  applica- 
t i o n  during t h e  period (equals  t h e  number of 
individuals  born in t h e  period,  exogenously 
given) . 
K: s tock  of corporate c a p i t a l  a t  t h e  beginning of t h e  
period (used f o r  production during t h e  period).  
B: t o t a l  s tock  of corporate indebtedness a t  t h e  
beginning of t h e  period, which must be repaid 
during t h e  period. 
F(K,L): t he  production function,  characterized by constant 
r e tu rns  t o  scale. 
D: t o t a l  d i s t r i bu t i on  made by t h e  corporation during 
the  period. 
gg: t o t a l  s tock of government indebtedness a t  t he  
beginning of t h e  period,  which must be repaid 
during the  period. 
t: r a t e  of t ax  on corporate d i s t r i bu t i ons  t o  stock- 
holders. 
There are two ordinary p r ices  in the  model (current  output is 
nuneraire) ,  and one price-l ike "valuation function": 
w : wage. 
d: t h e  discotmt rate; a bond payable next period sells 
f o r  d in t h e  current  period. 
V(K+,B+): a funct ion r e l a t i n g  t he  "ex dividend" value of 
corporate equity,  t h a t  is, the  value at t he  end 
of a period,  a f t e r  production is complete, t o  
t h e  f inanc ia l  and investment decisions of the  
current  owners. 
For any var iab le ,  X, l e t  X+, X*, e t c . ,  represent  i ts  
value in succeeding periods; X - its value i n  t h e  preceding 
e period. Let X+ denote the  value of X expected t o  obta in  in 
t h e  next period. 
There are th ree  c lasses  of agents in t h e  model, two displaying 
1 2  
maximizing behavior. The "young" t r y  t o  maximize U(c ,c+) 
i ( labor  is  supplied i n e l a s t i c a l l y ) ,  where c is consumption during 
the  ith period of t h e  l i f e  cycle.  The "old" manage t h e  corporat ion 
2 t o  maximize c , which m e a n s  maximize (1-t) D+V(K+,B+) . The t h i r d  
agent is t h e  government which, as has been mentioned, a c t s  mechanicallly 
g in managing the  cash flow according t o  dB+ = B g - t ~ .  
Evolution of the  Economy. 
The s i t u a t i o n  inher i t ed  from the p a s t  is described by (K,B,B~,L)  ,
with L evolving exogenously along a known path. The requirements 
placed on t h e  model world are t h a t  t h e  evolution t o  (K+,B+,B: ,L+) 
be determined by c lea r ing  of competitive "spot" markets f o r  l abor ,  
corporate bonds, government bonds, corporate equi ty  and goods, and 
that the expectat ions on which demands and suppl ies  depend be "ra t ional ."  
The general  notion of r a t i o n a l  expecta t ions ,  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  Muth (1961), 
here  encompasses two proper t ies :  Expectations are cor rec t ,  and they 
are determinate, in t h e  sense that they a r e  governed by knowledge of 
t h e  economic s t r u c t u r e  and t h e  current  state of t h e  economy. For 
r a t i o n a l  expectat ions t o  make sense, the re  must be an appropr ia te  degree 
of determinacy of t h e  model as a whole, including i ts expectations- 
formation. Solvfng t h e  model Involves showing t h a t  t h e  endogenous 
va r iab les ,  including p r ices  and expectat ions,  can be expressed as 
s ta t ionary  functions of t h e  state var iab les ,  K, B,  and Bg, given 
t h e  known path of  L. Properly, the re  should a s w e l l  be a demonstration 
t h a t  the  proposed equil ibrium path is  at least l o c a l l y  unique-other- 
wise, why should t h e  economic agents pick t h e  required q e c t a t i o n s -  
forming r u l e ?  
In my previous work I described an equil ibrium path of the  
economy sketched out  above. ( I  d id  not  a c t u a l l y  demonstrate l o c a l  
uniqueness, although I th ink the  s o l u t i o n  is probably g lobal ly  
unique.) The n e u t r a l i t y  r e s u l t  concerning t h e  r a t e  of t a x  on corporate 
d i s t r i b u t i o n s  followed from the  conclusion t h a t  t h e  equil ibrium 
valuat ion funct ion is  given by (1) . 
The ob jec t ive  of t h e  owners of t h e  f i rm is t o  set employment together  
with K+, B+ and D t o  nmxidze  (I-t)D + V(K+,B+) . I f  we sub- 
s t i t u t e  f o r  D i n  t h e  ob jec t ive  function,  using accounting re la t ion-  
sh ip  (2) among t h e  out lays  by t h e  f irm, B+ drops out .  
Maximizing values of the other  va r iab les  are independent of t ,  
while the f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  of t h e  f i rm is indeterminate. 
Indeterminacy of f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  corresponds t o  indeter-  
minacy of government t a x  rece ip t s .  The reason t h e  equil ibrium path 
of t h e  economy's real var iab les  and p r ices  is nonetheless determinate 
is suggested by the  expression (3) of equa l i ty  between t h e  value of 
demanded and supplied claims t o  f u t u r e  consumption: 
2 
where c+(d,w) is t h e  retirement-period consumption (which w i l l  take  . 
place next period) demanded by a represen ta t ive  young person, where 
t h e  values of K+ and B+ have been set by t h e  current  owners of t h e  
e firm, and where I have taken f o r  granted w+ = w+. The expression 
on the  l e f t  is the  value of claims demanded on the  bas i s  of l i f e -  
cycle optimization by members of t h e  young generation. The f i r s t  two 
terms on the  r i g h t  are the  values of bonds supplied,  and the  t h i r d  is 
t h e  value of corporate equity. Exploiting t he  government's budget 
cons t ra in t ,  dB: = B g - t ~ ,  and the  already mentioned accounting rela- 
t ionship  (2) between D and t h e  o ther  var iables ,  allows us t o  wr i t e  
condit ion (3) as 
Once again, B+ has been eliminated, so  t h e  condit ion is independent 
of corporate f i nanc i a l  policy. 
Equation (5) expresses a f u r t he r  reformulation of the  same condit ion,  
taking advantage of Euler ' s  theorem (an open question: Can one dispense 
with linear homogeneity of F?) : 
The left-hand s i d e  of (5) is, as before,  t he  demand by the  young genera- 
t i o n  f o r  assets. The right-hand s i de ,  the  economy's ne t  supply of assets, 
is t h e  d i f ference between gwernment bonds ca r r i ed  over from the  pas t  
and t h e  tax r e ce ip t s  t h a t  would be generated if t h e  corporation were 
t o  be l iquidated in t h e  current  period. The l a s t  term, in other  words, 
a f f ec t s  t h e  real equil ibrium path like an an t ic ipa ted  t a x  r ece ip t  "asset" 
of the government, o f f s e t t i n g  e x p l i c i t  government debt. Through t h i s  
re la t ionsh ip  one obta ins  a clear sense of why d e f i c i t s  o r  surpluses due 
t o  v a r i a t i o n s  in corporate d i s t r i b u t i o n s  have no e f f e c t  on the  real 
path of t h e  economy, even though government debt does matter. An 
increase in d i s t r i b u t i o n s  simultaneously reduces government debt 
and the  p o t e n t i a l  tax r e c e i p t  asset by equal amounts. 
3. Introducing Uncertainty. 
There a r e  var ious  ways one might introduce uncer ta in ty  t o  t h i s  
model. I have chosen t o  make t h e  f u t u r e  production condit ions de- 
pendent upon t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  state ( f o r  example, weather condit ions)  
occurring. Spec i f i ca l ly ,  I assume t h a t  t h e  investment decis ion is 
f ixed  in t h e  current  period,  but  t h e  a c t u a l  production funct ion is 
determined i n  the  next period. 
Let  S s t and  f o r  the set of poss ib le  states t h a t  might obta in  
in the  c ~ l r e n t  period,  S+ the  set of poss ib le  states in t h e  next 
period,  and s o  on. The l a r g e r  dimensionality of t h e  problem requ i res  
some new notat ion.  The following describes my compromise between 
comprehensiveness and mnemonics. Ln general ,  va r i ab les  a r e  now 
understood t o  have a subscr ip t  t o  designate t h e  s t a t e  and t h e  with 
which they are associated.  Thus, w i&S+, r e f e r s  t o  t h e  wage rate i ' 
red l i zed  i n  state i next period. Since t h e  s t o r y  starts with a knowa 
current  s t a t e ,  we can let var iab les  with no subscr ip t  r e f e r  t o  t h e  
values cur ren t ly  rea l i zed .  
I s h a l l  a l s o  assume t h a t  S is f i n i t e  in each period,  and t h a t  
an ordering has been agreed upon f o r  the  states in each period,  so  
we can use the' subsc r ip t  "+" t o  r e f e r  t o  t h e  vector  of values of a 
v a r i a b l e  obtaining in t h e  next  period. (I make an exception f o r  
==+ 
and I+, which keep t h e i r  previous scalar in te rp re ta t ion . )  Thus, 
e 
w r e f e r s  t o  the  vec to r  of wage r a t e s  present ly  an t i c ipa ted  f o r  next + ' 
period,  w i t h  components wi, i&S+, and has dimensionality equal t o  
t h e  number of states in S+. 
The f i rm and the  government must now speci fy ,  ins tead of t h e  
single-dimensional bonds, vectors  of s t a te - spec i f i c  claims, where, 
f o r  example, Bi, iES+, pays one u n i t  if state i is rea l i zed  next  
period, and zero  ff another state is  rea l i zed .  To i s s u e  a r i s k l e s s  
bond is equivalent  t o  s e l l i n g  one u n i t  each of claims Bi, iES+. 
Instead of t h e  s i n g l e  discount f a c t o r  d, we now have a vector  
of p r i c e s  of un i t  claims contingent  on the  next  per iod 's  state. I f  
e is the  vec to r  of ones of appropr ia te  dimension, e+-d is the  + 
p r i c e  of a riskless bond, Since w e  s h a l l  want t o  continue t o  use t h e  
ordinary subsc r ip t  t o  refer t o  t h e  state and time in which a par t icu-  
lar v a r i a b l e  is r e a l i z e d ,  f o r  example, di, iG+ is t h e  vec to r  of 
discount rates (appl icable  t o  claims on output  two periods 
hence) r ea l i zed  if s t a t e  i occurs next  period,  I s h a l l  use parentheses 
when I wish t o  i d e n t i f y  a p a r t i c u l a r  element of d. Thus, (d) i, i&S+, 
is a scalar, m e l y ,  the  present  p r i c e  of a claim t o  one unit i f  state 
i occurs next period. The 8-01 d+ r e f e r s  t o  the  natrir of dis -  
count f a c t o r  vec to r s ,  one f o r  each poss ib le  state t h a t  might be 
rea l i zed  next  period. 
We are now in a p o s i t i o n  t o  study the  analogues in t h e  world of 
r i s k  t o  t h e  temporary equil ibrium re la t ionsh ips  discussed earlier. 
We may guess, f o r  example, t h a t  t h e  valuat ion funct ion f o r  corporate 
equi ty  is given by (6).  
This is simply t h e  value  of t h e  vector  of payoffs, contingent on the  
state rea l i zed ,  tha t  t h e  purchaser of t h e  equi ty  expects  t o  ob ta in  
in t h e  form of d i s t r i b u t i o n  plus  proceeds from s a l e  of t h e  equi ty  
interest. 
To analyze asset market c l ea r ing  in t h i s  case,  i t  is not  s u f f i c i e n t  
t o  look a t  t h e  aggregate value  of present  claims, as w e  did  above. We 
must now look f o r  t h e  state-by-state equa l i ty  of suppl ies  and demands of 
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contingent claims. Recall t h a t  c+(v,d) is now t o  be in te rp re ted  
a s  the vector  of consumption planned by the  represen ta t ive  young person 
f o r  t h e  retirement period,  contingent on t h e  state rea l i zed .  A s s e t  
market c l ea r ing  now requ i res  t h e  vector  equation (7)  
where, as before,  w e  a r e  taking f o r  granted t h e  determination of K+ 
and w+ via other  equil ibrium re la t ionsh ips ,  given w and d. I n  
t h e  c e r t a i n t y  case  we were a b l e  t o  use the  government budget r e la t ion-  
ship ,  d.B: = Bg - t D ,  together with t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between D and 
B+, t o  eliminate both B+ and B! from t h e  asset market c lear ing 
condition. Under uncer ta in ty ,  t h e  combination of these  two re la t ion-  
ships  is no longer s u f f i c i e n t .  Whereas before,  const ra in ing t h e  value 
of t h e  govermnent's bond sales o r  purchases determined t h e  quant i ty  
(given d) , t h e  government now may choose among various combinations 
of s tate-contingent  claims, ( i .e . ,  d e a l  in bonds of d i f f e r e n t  r i s k  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ) .  Moreover, t h e  same can be sa id  of t h e  firm. Thus, 
i f  we t ake  as a s t a r t i n g  point  t h a t  the  government only i s s u e s  r i s k l e s s  
bonds (buys riskless bonds in t h e  case of negat ive  government deb t ) ,  
we have s t i l l  no t  pinned down temporary equil ibrium because t h e  r i s k  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  f i r m ' s  debt have not  been determined. Temporary 
equi l ibr ium the re fo re  depends on t h e  f i rm ' s  f i n a n c i a l  po l i cy ,  b u t ,  
s i n c e  t h e  f i rm is a price t a k e r ,  t h a t  pol icy  is s t i l l  a matter  of 
indi f ference .  The economy may apparently wander aimlessly.  
I f  both the  govermnent and t h e  corpora t ion  a r e  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  
riskless debt ,  t h e  argument goes through much a s  it d i d  in t he  r i sk -  
f r e e  analys is .  In tha t  case ,  extra bonds issued by the  corpora t ion  
generate not  only t h e  exact withdrawal in v&ue of government bonds 
(as  a consequence of e x t r a  taxes paid) required t o  maintain f i n a n c i a l  
market equil ibrium in view of t h e  associa ted  dec l ine  in t h e  value of 
corpora te  equi ty ,  but &so t h e  matching change in t h e  state-by-state 
contingent  claims. 
Neither assumption, r i sk-f ree  government bonds o r  r i sk - f ree  
corpora te  bonds is &together  a t t r a c t i v e .  In  a time of s t o c h a s t i c  
i n f l a t i o n  rates, government bonds are anything but  r i s k  f r e e .  More 
obviously, corpora te  bonds do carry d e f a u l t  r i s k .  
What is requi red  is a mechanism t o  a s su re  t h a t ,  in any period,  
tB+ + B: is independent of t h e  f i rm's  f i n a n c i a l  pol icy  and pre- 
determined as f a r  as government pol icy  is concerned. Here is one 
mechanism t o  b r ing  about t h e  des i red  result: Make it government 
pol icy  t o  purchase a f r a c t i o n  t of every corpora te  bond i s s u e ,  
while f i x i n g  i n  advance t h e  r i s k  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of government debt .  
I s h a l l  desc r ibe  t h i s  formally not  as the  purchase of corpora te  debt ,  
but as t h e  purchase ( i . e . ,  reduced supply) of t h e  equivalent  package 
of s t a t e - s p e c i f i c  claims on t h e  government. Taken l i t e r a l l y ,  such 
a pol icy  would change t h e  e x p l i c i t  r i s k  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of government 
debt.  Actual implementation, however, should be imagined a s  simul- 
taneous i s s u e  of e x t r a  government debt  and purchase of corpora te  
debt.  The e f f e c t  on t h e  government's p o r t f o l i o  of s t a t e - s p e c i f i c  
claims is t h e  same. 
The suggested pol icy  then is described by (8) 
where a is a pre-specif ied vec to r  with dimension equal  t o  the  s i z e  + 
of S+. (For example, a+ might equal  e+, i n  which case t h e  
government i s s u e s  riskless bonds.) 
Using t h e  accounting r e l a t i o n s h i p s  descr ib ing D , condi t ion  (8) 
impl ies  (a)  
providing t h e  des i red  independence of B: + tB+ from B+, while 
t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i a s  of government debt  a r e  determined by a. 
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